Análise de domínios cognitivos e de perfis epistemológicos do conceito de vírus presentes em artigos científicos

Abstract

This research aimed to identify and relate the cognitive domains and epistemological profiles of the concept of viruses present in scientific articles. The research proposition stemmed from the premise that there is a diversity of concepts of viruses disseminated by the scientific community, which can lead to theoretical disagreements. Therefore, conducting qualitative research involving the relationship between the cognitive domains of Benjamin Bloom and colleagues (1956) and the epistemological profiles of Gaston Bachelard (1971) allows for both cognitive and epistemological analysis of the concept of viruses in scientific articles. Cognitive domains measure and classify the complexity of intellectual operations, while epistemological profiles allow for the classification of what scientists do to interpret how and why they produce knowledge. This thesis uses a qualitative research approach, characterized as a documentary analysis and categorical content analysis, based on Bardin (1977). The central objective of the methodology was to operationalize the theoretical frameworks of the thesis – the cognitive domains and epistemological profiles – transforming them into a systematic analysis protocol. The research corpus consists of a total of 20 scientific articles that explicitly discuss the "concept of virus." Google Scholar was used as a database due to its multidisciplinary scope, allowing the concept of virus to be captured beyond virology, including philosophy of science, history, and sociology. Based on the inclusion and exclusion criteria for the articles, the analysis method involved the use of a two-dimensional analysis matrix: cognitive, which identifies the intellectual operation of the authors, and epistemological, which aims to identify the basis of validity of the statement about viruses. As a result, an affinity was identified between the epistemological profiles of naive realism and clear and positivist empiricism with the so-called cognitive domains of knowledge and understanding. The analysis of complex debates and, above all, the synthesis of new concepts and the evaluation of paradigms have proven to be intrinsically dependent on dialectical rationalism, the only profile capable of actively operating on contradiction to generate new knowledge. The thesis empirically demonstrates a connection between thought processes (cognitive domains) and the nature of knowledge (epistemological profiles). The main conclusion is that the development of critical and higher-order thinking (such as analysis, synthesis, and evaluation) is not merely a matter of skill, but fundamentally depends on the epistemological maturity of the individual. The thesis helps to understand that the problem is not (only) the lack of cognitive ability, but the fact that the individual is "stuck" in a limiting epistemological profile, such as naive realism or clear and positivist empiricism. By analyzing a concept, such as the definition of a virus, it is possible to understand not only what the person knows, but how they structure their belief about that knowledge. The most direct practical contribution is the validation of a new concept analysis tool: the double-entry analysis matrix (cognitive domains x epistemological profiles). This matrix is a functional and replicable tool that allows other researchers to diagnose the level of complexity of thought in different materials (textbooks, teachers' speech, students' responses). The implications for teaching involve a change in pedagogical practice, in which not only are skills or facts developed, but epistemological maturity is promoted through the creation and testing of teaching sequences based on epistemological rupture. The teacher must act actively to create, problematize, and overcome epistemological obstacles that encourage the student to confront the limitations of their worldview. For science communication, it is fundamental that complex topics such as viruses are not addressed by presenting facts, but rather through effective communication that challenges the public's "naive realism," helping them to make the necessary "epistemological break" to understand why science is often paradoxical and revisionist. Further developments arising from this research involve mapping epistemological obstacles that would impede the understanding of the concept of viruses, as well as testing the matrix on other scientific concepts.